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‘Who would go to Egypt?’ How tourism
accounts for ‘terrorism’
ELISA WYNNE-HUGHES*
Abstract. This article examines the tension between British and Egyptian counterterrorism dis-
courses and Western tourism industry discourses. I analyse how guidebooks like the Rough
Guide and Lonely Planet attract tourists by representing Egypt as an appealing tourist destina-
tion in a way that accounts for its positioning, in counterterrorism discourses, as a location
and source of terrorism. They do so by producing ‘risk’ in a very speciﬁc way. Guidebook
representations construct one extreme of Egyptian society as ‘bad’ Muslims who pose an
essential threat to Western tourists and their inherently progressive liberal democratic values.
Having deﬁned risk in this way, guidebooks justify the production of ‘states of exception’ and
‘exceptional states’ that exclude ‘bad’ Muslims and protect Western tourists. These strategies
function together to construct Egypt as non-threatening and appealing to tourists. I argue
that guidebooks not only account for terrorism but represent Egypt in a way that largely rein-
forces British and Egyptian ‘war on terror’ strategies. These strategies similarly protect subjects
and spaces that uphold Western liberal democratic values. This article highlights the constitu-
tive role of tourism in international politics and simultaneously helps us better understand the
complex and mundane means by which the current Western liberal order is (re)produced.
Elisa Wynne-Hughes is a PhD student at the University of Bristol. Her current research examines
the international politics of tourism, focusing speciﬁcally on ‘contact zones’ in Cairo.
This article looks at British tourism to Egypt1 and asks the question: Who would go
to Egypt? Who would go to Egypt when Britain’s counterterrorism strategy positions
Egypt as a primary origin of inspiration and planning for international terrorism?2
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* I wish to acknowledge the valuable feedback I received on this article from L. L. Wynn and two
anonymous reviewers at the Review of International Studies. This article was also greatly enriched by
comments from and discussions with Cerelia Athanassiou, Terrell Carver, Amanda Chisholm, Ryerson
Christie, Lara Coleman, Vivian Ibrahim, Melanie Richter-Montpetit, Joanna Tidy, Jutta Weldes,
Antonia Wynne-Hughes, and Susan Wynne-Hughes. My research for this article was funded by the
UK Overseas Research Students Awards Scheme and the University of Bristol.
1 This article was written before the 25 January 2011 revolution. Unless otherwise indicated, all references
to Egypt, the Egyptian government, and its policies/discourses relate to Egypt’s pre-revolution period
under Hosni Mubarak. It is difﬁcult to comment on the impact of the revolution in this article as Egypt
is currently in a process of transition.
2 The United Kingdom’s 2009 counterterrorism strategy, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, also known as
CONTEST, explicitly asserts that the sources of inspiration and planning for international terrorism are
‘overseas’, and positions Egypt as a primary source of origin and threat of terrorism.
See Home Ofﬁce, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Inter-
national Terrorism (2009), available at: {http://security.homeofﬁce.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/}
accessed 31 January 2010, pp. 85, 141. CONTEST identiﬁes ‘international terrorism’ as the current
source of threats to the UK and its interests overseas in. International terrorism includes those groups
or individuals directly and indirectly connected with al-Qaeda and its ideology, located in ‘the Near
Who would go to Egypt when the Egyptian government itself frequently highlights
threats from terrorism?3 Interestingly, explicit links established between international
terrorism and Egypt have not greatly deterred British tourism to this country. In
2006, British tourists represented the highest proportion of visitors to Egypt. Since
then, the UK has remained amongst the top three source countries.4 Timothy Mitchell
argues that mass tourism, as against mass production, involves the organisation of
people to consume rather than produce.5 As such it is the imperative of travel texts
that beneﬁt from this industry to produce a community of consumers through their
representations of destinations. Travel texts must negotiate the tension between coun-
terterrorism discourses that paint Egypt as a hotbed of terrorist activity, and their
need to attract customers.
What I am interested in exploring is how British tourism texts, such as guide-
books, represent Egypt as an appealing tourist destination in a way that accounts
for its positioning as a location and source of terrorism. I argue in this article that
guidebooks use two strategies that work together to represent Egypt as a destination
attractive to British tourists. They lay the groundwork for these strategies by produc-
ing ‘risk’6 in a very speciﬁc way. Guidebook representations of Egyptian spaces and
subject construct one extreme of society as ‘bad’ Muslims. These ‘bad’ Muslims adhere
to a form of Islam that is essentially threatening to Western tourists and their inherently
progressive Western liberal democratic values. These values include the recognition
of individual rights and freedoms, representative government, and the rule of law,
within a free market system. They are characterised as ‘Western’ not with reference
solely to geography but in the sense that they are associated with, and have been used
East (Palestine, Israel, Lebanon); Iraq; South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India); North Africa (the
Maghreb, Libya and Egypt) and the Horn of Africa; and South East Asia (primarily Indonesia)’
(pp. 33–4). In its outline of the historical development of international terrorism CONTEST identiﬁes
the origins of the current international terrorist threat in Islamist militant ideologies that arose in Egypt
in the late 1970s and early 80s, spreading to Afghanistan and Algeria. In 1998, al-Qaeda and the old
Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged to form the ‘World Islamic Front’, which called for attacks on the
citizens of the US and its allies around the world (pp. 24–5). Meanwhile, terrorism propagandists from
Algeria and Egypt had moved to the UK, and British-based extremist organisations started supporting
participation in overseas terrorism, while al-Qaeda began recruiting British nationals and setting up a
UK network (pp. 28–9). The 2009 document was replaced in July 2011, after this article was written
and revised for publication. See Home Ofﬁce, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Coun-
tering Terrorism (2011), available at: {http://www.homeofﬁce.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/
counter-terrorism-strategy} accessed 6 October 2011.
3 The most recent Egyptian government frequently used threats to its national security, from ‘destabiliz-
ing factors’ including ‘the position of the northern part of the Sinai desert which borders Gaza, the
activities of the terrorist organization Hizbullah, the presence on the Egyptian territory of elements
linked to the terrorist organization Al-Qaida, the increased accessibility of Al-Qaida’s propaganda
online, the existence of Islamist movements in the Middle East in general and the presence of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in particular’ to justify its ongoing state of emergency. See United
Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Mission to Egypt (2009)
available at: {http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/rapporteur/reports.htm} accessed 31
January 2010, p. 7. Egypt is currently run by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, which highlights
similar threats to maintain, and indeed extend, the state of emergency. See Samer al-Atrush, ‘Egypt
military to widen state of emergency’, AFP (12 September 2011), available at: {http://www.google.
com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gC0xgXy1LelXX6mYEGGHQBiYOMBQ?docId=
CNG.37f490980793ed822010b69c4858a6ab.411} accessed 6 October 2011.
4 Egypt Tourism Report (London: Business Monitor International Ltd., 2010).
5 Timothy Mitchell, ‘Worlds Apart: An Egyptian Village and the International Tourism Industry’,
Middle East Report, 196 (1995), pp. 8–23, 10.
6 Any reference to ‘risk’ or ‘threat’ in this article assumes that it is socially constituted, in line with my
post-structural theoretical framework (see pp. 617–618).
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historically to (re)produce, a ‘West’ and ‘Western’ subjects that are privileged and
protected in relation to correspondingly constructed ‘others’. Post-colonial theorists
draw attention to the co-constitution of the so-called West and non-West, not only
in terms of how the former has been deﬁned in hierarchical opposition with the
latter, but in terms of how they have selectively appropriated each others’ ideas and
practices.7
Having deﬁned risk in this way, the ﬁrst strategy guidebooks use to attract Western
tourists is to justify Egyptian government measures that protect these tourists by
locating ‘bad’ Muslims in ‘states of exception’, where their legal, political, and
economic rights are suspended. The second guidebook strategy is to locate Western
tourists in ‘exceptional states’, (re)producing subject positions and reiﬁed spaces that
are inherently privileged and protected as they ‘ﬁt’ along a timeline that ends with
Western liberal democracy. In the context of contemporary iterations of liberalism,
these strategies function together to construct Egyptian spaces and subjects as non-
threatening and appealing to tourists. Guidebooks thereby make risk known in a
way that produces very speciﬁc solutions, justifying exceptions that privilege and
protect the lives and rights of those seen as adhering to the values of Western liberal
democracy.
These two strategies articulate intertextually8 with tactics employed by UK and
Egyptian counterterrorism discourses, which are part of the post 9/11 ‘war on terror’
discourse. These discourses similarly justify and produce ‘states of exception’ and
‘exceptional states’ that together protect subjects and spaces that uphold Western
liberal democratic values. These mutually constructed ‘states’ reveal the complex
logic of exception that acts as an underlying principle of Western liberal democracy,
protecting its values and (re)producing a particular world order. I argue that guide-
books not only account for terrorism, but also represent Egypt in a way that largely
reinforces the discourses of British and Egyptian counterterrorism strategies, reveal-
ing the constitutive role of tourism in international politics.
Producing discourse: articulation and representation
To make this argument I perform a post-structural discourse analysis of guidebooks
and UK and Egyptian counterterrorism strategies. When I use the term ‘discourse’
I refer to systems of signiﬁcation that (re)produce meanings about the social world,
ordering its subjects and objects accordingly. I refer to the constituent parts of dis-
courses as ‘elements’, which include a broad range of ‘materials’ including artefacts,
sites, and practices. A discourse is produced when, in a particular context, dispersed
elements come to share a regularity or logic in their meanings, coming to be related
7 See Anna Agathangelou, ‘ ‘‘Sexing’’ Globalization in International Relations: Migrant Sex and Domestic
Workers in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey’, in Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair (eds), Power, Post-
colonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class (New York: Routledge, 2004),
pp. 142–69; Marshall J. Beier, International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology, and
the Limits of International Theory (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005); Derek Gregory, The Colonial
Present (Malden; Oxford; Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 4–5; Edward W. Said, Orientalism
(London: Penguin Books, 2003); Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books,
1994); Laura Ann Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the
Colonial Order of Things (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 1995).
8 See pp. 617–618 for deﬁnitions.
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in a way that constitutes a partial ﬁxity, taken as natural or true.9 A discourse, though
not arbitrary, is always unstable, incomplete and contingent, allowing for articulations
to occur that may redirect or reinforce it.10 The dominant tourism discourse, for
instance, relies on binaries of home/away, tourist/local, authentic/commodiﬁed, work/
leisure, and virtue/pleasure, which are reinforced within tourism scholarship and popu-
lar discourses.11 Binaries function to differentiate two terms in a way that mutually
deﬁnes them, often privileging one over the other. These binaries, many of which
are embedded in colonial representations and social relations, shape people’s under-
standings of themselves and the world, inﬂuencing their practices in ways that rein-
force these logics.
Guidebook representations play a role in the production of these tourism discourses.
In this article, I examine how guidebook representations also articulate with and
reinforce other dominant discourses, speciﬁcally ‘war on terror’ discourses that pro-
tect a Western liberal order. By ‘articulation’ I refer to the process that partially ﬁxes
meaning by discursively linking the elements of discourses, making them intelligible
through chains of connotations with other discourses, and in the process altering
their identity as the relation between them produces new meanings.12 Representa-
tional practices are one way that meanings are partially ﬁxed through the articula-
tion and repetition of particular truths in a speciﬁc context. Jutta Weldes argues
that through the process of articulation, elements of discourses are recombined to
produce ‘contingent and contextually speciﬁc representations of the world’ that give
its elements particular meanings. Through the repetition of these representations,
these meanings become naturalised, shaping the way that people understand and act
in the world.13 In examining representational practices I am not, however, trying to
9 See Stuart Hall, ‘Signiﬁcation, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates’,
Critical Studies in Media Communication, 2:2 (1985), pp. 91–114, 104; Ernest Laclau and Chantal
Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso,
1985), p. 106; Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1996), p. 309; Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile
Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 98; Gillian Rose, Visual Methodologies:
An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials (London: Sage, 2001), p. 138; Sara Mills,
Discourse, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 17.
10 See Hall, ‘Signiﬁcation, Representation, Ideology’, p. 94; Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy, p. 110.
11 See John Urry, The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies (London: Sage Publica-
tions, 1990); John Urry, Consuming Places (London; New York: Routledge, London, 1995); Edward
M. Bruner, ‘The Transformation of Self in Tourism’, Annals of Tourism Research, 18 (1991), pp. 238–
50; Edward M. Bruner, ‘Tourism in the Balinese Borderzone’, in Sharon Bohn Gmelch (ed.), Tourists
and Tourism: A Reader (Illinois: Waveland Press, 2004), pp. 219–38; Edward M. Bruner, Culture on
Tour: Ethnographies of Travel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Tom Selwyn, ‘Introduc-
tion’, in Tom Selwyn (ed.), The Tourist Image: Myths and Myth Making in Tourism (Chichester: John
Wiley and Sons, 1996), pp. 1–31; Adrian Franklin and Michael Crang, ‘The Trouble with Tourism and
Travel Theory?’, Tourist Studies, 1:1 (2001), pp. 5–22; John P. Taylor, ‘Authenticity and Sincerity in
Tourism’, Annals of Tourism Research, 28:1 (2001), pp. 7–26; Erik Cohen, ‘Backpacking: Diversity
and Change’, in Sharon Bohn Gmelch (ed.), Tourists and Tourism: A Reader (Illinois: Waveland Press,
2004), pp. 389–405; Chris Rojek and John Urry, ‘Introduction’, in Chris Rojek and John Urry (eds),
Touring Cultures: Transformations of Travel and Theory, 4th edn (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 1–
19; Debbie Lisle, ‘Gazing at Ground Zero: Tourism, Voyeurism and Spectacle’, Journal for Cultural
Research, 8:1 (2004), pp. 3–21; Debbie Lisle, The Global Politics of Contemporary Travel Writing
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Debbie Lisle, ‘Humanitarian Travels: Ethical Com-
munication in Lonely Planet Guidebooks’, Review of International Studies, 34 (2008), pp. 155–72.
12 See Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 10; Weldes, Constructing National Interests,
p. 99.
13 Weldes, Constructing National Interests, p. 99.
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ﬁnd the ‘reality’ behind them but understand them rather as constitutive. As Edward
W. Said argues, ‘there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but a re-presence, or a
representation’,14 contending that objects and subjects do not pre-exist their constitu-
tion through representational practices.
For the purposes of this article I deﬁne representational practices broadly. My
discourse analysis examines not only textual and visual representations, such as the
words and images found in guidebooks, but also the practices of policymaking and
the organisation of spaces that function to represent Egypt. Speciﬁcally it analyses
the Lonely Planet: Egypt (LP) and The Rough Guide: Egypt (RG),15 two of the
most popular guidebooks in the world.16 These texts are produced by and for Western,
and mainly British, tourists; they are published in the UK17 and reveal their audience
by, among other things, citing travel advisories from the Australian, British, Canadian,
New Zealand, Irish, and US governments as recommended pre-departure reading.18
Guidebooks construct themselves as a mediator between tourists, their locations and
local populations, taking the role of human guides,19 but as Debbie Lisle points out
these texts are not neutral but ‘framed in advance by the ethical vision of the com-
pany’.20 This article analyses the corresponding logics and resonances in guidebooks’
textual and visual representations rather than how these are received and acted upon
by tourists themselves. It was written in the context of extensive ﬁeldwork in Cairo as
part of a research project on the international politics of tourism.
To understand how guidebook representations articulate intertextually with those
found in UK and Egyptian counterterrorism I study both primary and secondary
sources. I examine UK counterterrorism discourse through a discursive analysis of
the textual representational practices found in Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, also
known as CONTEST, the country’s strategy for countering international terrorism,
published by the British Home Ofﬁce in 2009.21 I analyse the representational practices
of Egyptian counterterrorism by drawing on secondary sources that discuss the dis-
courses (re)produced by the most recent Egyptian government and by economic
elites.22 To further explore Egyptian counterterrorism strategies I analyse a 2009
14 Said, Orientalism, p. 21.
15 Matthew D. Firestone, Zora O’Neill, Anthony Sattin, and Rafael Wlodarski, Lonely Planet Egypt, 9th
edn (Hawthorne: Lonely Planet Publications, 2008); Dan Richardson and Daniel Jacobs, The Rough
Guide to Egypt, 7th edn (New York; London; Delhi: Rough Guides, 2007).
16 Lisle, ‘Humanitarian Travels’, p. 166.
17 BBC Worldwide acquired a 75 per cent share in the Lonely Planet in 2009. Lonely Planet, ‘About Lonely
Planet’, website, available at: {http://www.lonelyplanet.com/about/} accessed 31 January 2010.
Rough Guides Ltd has its headquarters in London. Rough Guide, ‘Welcome to Rough Guides’, website,
available at: {www.roughguides.com} accessed 31 January 2010.
18 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 507; Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, p. 74.
19 Deborah P. Bhattacharyya, ‘Mediating India: An Analysis of a Guidebook’, Annals of Tourism
Research, 24:2 (1997), pp. 371–89.
20 Lisle, ‘Humanitarian Travels’, p. 161.
21 The 2009 document was replaced in July 2011, after this article was written and revised for publication,
but is subject to similar critiques. See Home Ofﬁce, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Coun-
tering Terrorism (2011), available at: {http://www.homeofﬁce.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/
counter-terrorism-strategy} accessed 6 October 2011. For a summary of the changes and initial critiques
see ‘Updated anti-extremism strategy published’, BBC News (8 June 2011), available at: {http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13679360} accessed 6 October 2011.
22 These include Robert Vitalis, ‘Middle East on the Edge of the Pleasure Periphery’, Middle East Report,
196 (1995), pp. 2–7; Timothy Mitchell, ‘Making the Nation: The Politics of Heritage in Egypt’, in
Nezar AlSayyad (ed.), Consuming Tradition, Manufacturing Heritage: Global Norms and Urban Forms
in the Age of Tourism (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 212–39; Eric Denis, ‘Cairo as Neo-Liberal
Capital? From Walled City to Gated Communities’, in Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (eds), Cairo
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report from ‘The Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism’ (SRS).23 The repre-
sentations found in UK and Egyptian counterterrorism discourses articulate inter-
textually with guidebooks’ representations in the sense that the latter are made
intelligible and reinforced not in isolation but through the meanings produced by
the former.24
In my analysis I seek to identify key intertextually articulated themes, logics or
regularities, which produce the particular claims to truth or conditions of possibility
that constitute a discourse. I also pay attention to complexities, instabilities, contra-
dictions, and indeed exclusions, as well as whether and how these are reconciled.25 In
so doing I am not looking to characterise these articulated discourses as ﬁxed, but
rather to understand how they articulate in speciﬁc spatio-temporal contexts to pro-
duce very particular, contingent, and complex representations, with the associated
asymmetries, boundaries, and exclusions they require and reproduce. Speciﬁcally I
examine how current representations of Egyptian and tourist spaces and subjects in
guidebooks articulate intertextually with UK and Egyptian counter-terror discourses
to produce states of exception and exceptional states required to (re)produce the
current Western liberal order.
Producing risk: representation of Egyptian spaces and subjects
Guidebooks depict Egypt as an appealing tourist destination, accounting for ‘terrorism’
in their representations of the speciﬁc subjects and spaces posing a risk to Western
tourists. These representations shape how this risk is known and managed in a way
that articulates intertextually with UK and Egyptian counterterrorism discourses
and strategies. Guidebooks construct risk by highlighting two extremes of Egyptian
society, one of which poses an inherent threat to Western tourists and their values.
The RG highlights the oppositions between the ‘rich and poor, westernization and
traditionalism, complacency and desperation’.26 The LP guide similarly depicts one
Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture and Urban Space in the New Middle East (Cairo: The American Univer-
sity in Cairo Press, 2006), pp. 47–71; Yasser Elsheshtawy, ‘Urban Transformations: Social Control at
al-Rifa’i Mosque and Sultan Hasan Square’, in Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (eds), Cairo Cosmo-
politan: Politics, Culture and Urban Space in the New Middle East (Cairo: The American University in
Cairo Press, 2006), pp. 295–312; Petra Kuppinger, ‘Pyramids and Alleys: Global Dynamics and Local
Strategies in Giza’, in Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (eds), Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture and
Urban Space in the New Middle East (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2006), pp. 313–
44; Diane Singerman and Paul Amar, ‘Introduction: Contesting Myths, Critiquing Cosmopolitanism,
and Creating the New Cairo School of Urban Studies’, in Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (eds), Cairo
Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture and Urban Space in the New Middle East (Cairo: The American Univer-
sity in Cairo Press, 2006), pp. 1–46; Caroline Williams, ‘Reconstructing Islamic Cairo: Forces at Work’,
in Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (eds), Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture and Urban Space in
the New Middle East (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2006), pp. 269–94; L. L. Wynn,
Pyramids and Nightclubs: A Travel Ethnography of Arab and Western Imaginations of Egypt, from King
Tut and a Colony of Atlantis to Rumors of Sex Orgies, Urban Legends about a Marauding Prince, and
Blonde Belly Dancers (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007).
23 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Mission to Egypt (2009)
available at: {http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/rapporteur/reports.htm} accessed 31
January 2010.
24 Rose, Visual Methodologies, p. 136.
25 Ibid., pp. 150–8.
26 Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, p. 83.
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extreme of society as made up of those for whom ‘all is God’s will’, that represent
‘traditional conservatism’, ‘reinforced by poverty’, and that foam at the mouth over
the US’s unwavering support for Israel. On the other extreme are those ‘who never
set foot in a mosque until the day they are laid out in one’, who can afford to eat
at McDonald’s and regularly travel to the US.27 Guidebooks thereby differentiate
between these two extremes of Egyptian society based on their religiosity, which
guidebooks connect with their class and level of support for the West.28
Having constructed this duality, guidebooks go on to depict Islam,29 and its
associations with poverty and terrorism, in a way that suggests that those at the
more religious extreme of society are inherently different from, and indeed threaten-
ing to, tourists. Both guidebooks highlight how Islam means ‘submission’,31 and go
on to describe how it ‘permeates’31 or ‘pervades’32 Egyptian life. The LP mentions
twice how ‘it’s there’33 or ‘prevails’34 at an ‘almost subconscious’35 or ‘unconscious’
level.36 In so doing guidebooks suggest an adherence to Islam that is automatic,
passive – even innate – rather than rational. They associate the religious extreme of
society with a form of Islam that is conservative and static. The RG historicises this
form of Islam as a branch that broke from the West, discouraged innovation, and
became static, in direct opposition to the ‘west’s secularism and materialism’.37
The assumptions behind the RG’s characterisation of Islam articulate with much of
Western liberal social theory, which is based on a narrative of progress and reason
that associates the presence of religion in the political and public – rather than solely
private – realm with reactionary backwardness and as an obstacle to modernisa-
tion.38 The guidebook thereby suggests an inherent connection between this branch of
Islam and economic backwardness, functioning to naturalise secularism and capitalism,
key tenets of Western liberal democracy, as crucial to progress.
Guidebooks also suggest that terrorism is inherent to this form of Islam, depict-
ing it as essentially violent, anti-Western, and requiring absolute compliance from its
followers. The RG and LP identify the terrorist groups carrying out attacks in Egypt
as motivated by a hatred for the West, non-Muslims, and the secular Egyptian
27 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, pp. 63–4, 16.
28 These two extremes are also differentiated based on the status of women in each (Firestone et al.,
Lonely Planet Egypt, pp. 63–4, 16). In the interests of space, however, I have chosen to focus on how
guidebooks differentiate between the extremes of Egyptian society based on religiosity, class, and level
of support for the West.
29 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, pp. 63–8; Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, pp. 6,
785–7.
30 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 66; Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, pp. 6, 785.
31 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 63.
32 Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, p. 6.
33 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 63.
34 Ibid., p. 66.
35 Ibid., p. 63.
36 Ibid.
37 Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, pp. 787–8.
38 Shampa Biswas, ‘The ‘‘New Cold War’’: Secularism, Orientalism and Postcoloniality’, in Geeta Chowdhry
and Sheila Nair (eds), Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and
Class (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 187–8. Modernisation theory, which developed after World
War II, portrays Western liberal democracy as a universal ﬁnal stage in the transition from ‘pre-modern/
traditional’ to ‘modern’ societies according to a teleological model of development. Other countries
are read, evaluated, and managed according to this ‘stages of growth model’. See Jonathan Crush,
Power of Development (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 9–10.
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state.39 They outline how most of these attacks have taken place against Western
tourists,40 asserting that ‘jihadist militants do see any non-Muslim foreigner as a
potential target’.41 Guidebooks hold the Muslim Brotherhood and their ‘pro-Islamist
family’ responsible for most attacks and highlight their links with al-Qaeda.42
The LP partly contextualises terrorists’ grievances, arguing that Egypt’s Islamists
are a ‘political response to harsh socio-economic conditions’ and a repressive political
system.43 The guide highlights the work ethic and community spirit of the majority
of Egyptians, thereby positioning them as ‘victims’ of underdevelopment who have
been denied equality of opportunity.44 However, the LP depicts Egypt’s political
and economic underdevelopment as wholly endogenous, due to the government’s
failure to fully implement economic liberalisation, ‘Western-style democracy’, and
human rights.45 By failing to question the goals of liberal democracy, the LP func-
tions to locate Egypt as behind in a linear understanding of historical progression
according to Western notions of development. Guidebook representations of terrorism
in Egypt fail to contextualise Egypt’s political and economic relationship with the
West, which might mean admitting some Western complicity in terrorists’ grievances.
They point out only that Egypt has become dependent on US aid,46 which if any-
thing positions the West as a benefactor. At the same time guidebooks obscure the
role played by European powers to encourage debt in the nineteenth century, which
led to the British occupation,47 and the role of Western liberalisation policies48 since
the 1990s,49 which have increased the gap between rich and poor in Egypt.50 Guide-
book tourists are similarly positioned as unquestionably superior and altruistic
benefactors who make sustainable consumer choices, starting with their choice of
guidebook that recommends – and itself makes – ﬁnancial donations to counteract
the effects of underdevelopment.51 In so doing guidebooks fail to question the role
39 Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, pp. 57–8; Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, pp. 44–5.
40 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 45; Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, pp. 57–8,
783.
41 Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, pp. 57–8.
42 Ibid., pp. 134, 783, 789; Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, pp. 44–5.
43 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 44.
44 Ibid., p. 64.
45 Ibid., pp. 64, 44–5.
46 Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, p. 781; Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 16.
47 For more details see Wynn, Pyramids and Nightclubs, pp. 58, 64; F. Robert Hunter, ‘Tourism and
Empire: The Thomas Cook and Son Enterprise on the Nile, 1868–1914’, Middle Eastern Studies, 40:5
(2004), pp. 28–54.
48 For more detail on such liberalisation policies see Manfred B. Steger and Ravi K. Roy, Neoliberalism:
A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 19–20.
49 See Thomas Richter and Christian Steiner, ‘Politics, Economics and Tourism Development in Egypt:
Insights into the Sectoral Transformation of a Neo-Patrimonial Rentier State’, Third World Quarterly,
29:5 (2008), pp. 939–59; Matthew Gray, ‘Economic Reform, Privatization and Tourism in Egypt’,
Middle Eastern Studies, 34:2 (1998), pp. 91–112.
50 Indeed, although Egypt has been referred to as the International Monetary Fund’s ‘model pupil’ (‘The
IMF’s Model Pupil’, Economist, 350:8111 [1999] pp. 4–7), enjoying foreign direct investment of 13
billion in 2008 and growth rates of around 7 per cent, this ‘success’ has only beneﬁtted the top 10
per cent of society and absolute poverty has grown from 16.7 per cent to 20 per cent in the last
10 years. Jack Shenker, ‘And Rich Got Richer’, The Guardian (8 November 2009), available at:
{http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/nov/08/egypt-imf} accessed 11 February 2011.
See also Timothy Mitchell, ‘No Factories, No Problems: The Logic of Neo-Liberalism in Egypt’,
Review of African Political Economy, 26:82 (1999), pp. 455–68, 460–1, 463.
51 Guidebooks outline their contributions to charity projects that are meant to address the environmental
and social effects of tourism, largely through development and carbon offsetting schemes, recom-
mending that tourists themselves contribute to these schemes. They also give tips on economically and
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of Western tourism in colonialism and asymmetrical economic development,52
instead naturalising individualised market-based solutions and charity to overcome
underdevelopment. Without such contextualisation, terrorists’ violent anti-Western
stance, and consequent violence towards tourists, are constructed as irrational and
indeed essential to a form of Islam that requires automatic ‘submission’ from its
followers. This essentialised threat, positioned as it is in opposition to the altruistic
West and its subjects, functions to imply that the West and its tourists are economi-
cally and morally superior through their adherence to Western liberal values that
emphasise rational thinking, secularism, and autonomy. Guidebooks’ representations
of Egyptian subjects thereby make risk known in a very particular way, suggesting
that, in Egyptian spaces, Western tourists are constantly under threat from an inherently
violent and irrational sector of society.
Guidebook representations articulate intertextually with British and Egyptian
counterterrorism discourses that construct similarly deﬁned spaces and threatening
subjects. CONTEST, the UK counterterrorism strategy released by the Home Ofﬁce
in 2009, deﬁnes and seeks to detect those states and citizens ‘vulnerable’ to radi-
calisation and involvement in international terrorism. CONTEST does not assume
that all Muslims are terrorists but links a form of Islam – directly and indirectly con-
nected with al-Qaeda and its ideology53 – with violence. It argues that this new form
of international terrorism,54 involving indiscriminate violence to cause maximum civil-
ian casualties, has an explicitly religious agenda to establish a new world order as a
duty to the Islamic faith.55 CONTEST thereby articulates intertextually with guide-
books to identify and similarly deﬁne the speciﬁc spaces and subjects that pose a
risk based on their adherence to a particular form of Islam. Any other CONTEST
representations of potential terrorist states and subjects, which associate them with
‘underdevelopment’ and a hatred for the West and its values, therefore presuppose
that they are Muslim.
Having established a form of Islam as the basis for terrorism, CONTEST follows
the guidebooks’ approach of effacing Western complicity in the origins of interna-
tional terrorism. It does so by explicitly asserting that, although al-Qaeda recruits
members in the UK, the sources of inspiration and planning for terrorism are ‘over-
seas’.56 It also directly connects states, and individuals’ ‘vulnerability’ to terrorist
involvement with grievances related to their lower stage of political and economic
development according to a Western liberal democratic model. However, like the
LP, CONTEST identiﬁes this underdevelopment as wholly endogenous to those
(Muslim) states concerned, belying any Western involvement. Speciﬁcally, it contends
environmentally sustainable purchasing. The LP and RG encourage tourists to counteract the effects of
underdevelopment in Egypt by supplementing people’s income through tips or paying extra for taxis.
Firestone et al., Lonely Planet, pp. 524, 480, 85, 18, 63; Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt,
pp. 28, 553.
52 Richter and Steiner explain that tourism was speciﬁcally encouraged by the IMF to compensate for
Egypt’s losses from the decline of oil rent revenues in the 1980s. Those beneﬁtting from liberal structural
adjustment policies are the small number of ﬁnancial elites who own major Egyptian tour companies
and tourism real estate, as well as Western tour companies and major international hotel chains. See
Richter and Steiner, ‘Politics, Politics, Economics and Tourism Development in Egypt’, pp. 939, 951;
Vitalis, ‘Middle East on the Edge of the Pleasure Periphery’, p. 7. Regarding the links between tourism
and colonialism see p. 22.
53 Home Ofﬁce, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, pp. 33–4.
54 Such international terrorism is explicitly differentiated from ‘Irish-related terrorism’ and ‘domestic
extremism’ such as animal rights extremists. Home Ofﬁce, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, p. 59.
55 Ibid., pp. 22, 28–9, 33–4, 36–7, 41–2.
56 Ibid., pp. 28–9, 36, 85, 141.
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that the origins of contemporary international terror networks lie in ‘fragile and failed
states’ caused by ‘economic collapse, poor governance, the abuse of human rights’.57
Meanwhile, those UK citizens vulnerable to radicalisation are identiﬁed as those
(Muslims) who lack the opportunity to integrate due to social, economic, and political
exclusions.58 Although CONTEST recognises that these are partly due to racial and
religious discrimination, it also associates such exclusions with what is ‘more generally
a lack of afﬁnity with and disconnect from family, community and state’, suggesting
that more inherent factors contribute to Muslims’ lack of integration into modern,
society.59 Indeed, Shampa Biswas argues that, within Western secular discourse,
religious fundamentalisms are often ‘presented as (traditionalist) reactions to the dis-
locations and alienations of modernity,’ connecting Islam with tradition and presup-
posing ‘progressive secularization’ according to the ideal of Western liberal democracy
as the basis for modernisation.60 Insofar as it identiﬁes a form of Islam with innate
violence connected with endogenous ‘underdevelopment’, CONTEST articulates inter-
textually with guidebooks to construct Islam as inherently backward according to
Western standards of progress.
At the same time, CONTEST associates (Muslims’) vulnerability to terrorist
involvement with an irrational hatred for the West and its rights, institutions and values.
CONTEST outlines how (Muslim) states and citizens turn their local grievances
into grievances against the West – and especially the US and UK – for causing
or failing to remedy ‘conﬂict, failure and suffering’ in Islamic countries, arguing
that the ‘terrorist narrative’ exploits such political events.61 By effacing (almost)
any Western responsibility for Muslim-terrorist grievances, and depicting the West
as their target whether or not it intervenes in ‘conﬂicts, failure and suffering’,
CONTEST suggests that targeting the West is irrational, and indeed based on an
essential hatred for its rights, institutions, and values. According to this logic, anyone –
or at least any Muslim – who criticises government policies and British values can
be seen as ‘at risk’ of radicalisation, thereby foreclosing political dissent that is not
based on prior acceptance of these policies and values. Indeed, CONTEST cites any
support for ‘US military withdrawal from Islamic countries’ as an example of one of
the ‘political goals associated with Al Qa’ida’. By stating that ‘it is from among those
who . . . hold these views that terrorist groups are able to recruit and survive’,62
CONTEST paints any (Muslims) who critique US and UK interventions as potential
terrorists.
In so doing, CONTEST not only forecloses any British responsibility for Muslim-
terrorist grievances but simultaneously depicts the UK as altruistic in its international
role. CONTEST outlines the UK’s goal to remove barriers to ‘vulnerable’ states, and
citizens’ political, economic and social development and integration according to
Western standards.63 CONTEST therefore argues that Britain’s response to terror
57 Home Ofﬁce, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, p. 41.
58 As examples of such exclusions, CONTEST cites speciﬁcally inequalities in education, health, housing,
the labour market, along with a lack of social mobility, underemployment, and feelings of ‘not being
accepted or not belonging’ (HO, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, pp. 89, 91, 44).
59 Home Ofﬁce, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, p. 44.
60 Biswas, ‘The ‘‘New Cold War’’ ’, pp. 186, 190.
61 Home Ofﬁce, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, pp. 41–2, 43–6, 48, 50.
62 Ibid., p. 45.
63 CONTEST promotes supporting vulnerable individuals and states to develop through an increase in
social and economic opportunities. The UK Department for International Development programmes,
for example, speciﬁcally aims to reduce inequality, improve local governance and increase locals’ access
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‘has at all times upheld the principles and values of the UK as a liberal democracy’,64
which include ‘human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable govern-
ment, justice, freedom, tolerance and opportunity for all’.65 In this way, the UK
and its subjects are positioned as superior in their universally derived and applied
values, requiring protection against those without such values. CONTEST, like the
guidebooks, constructs risk in a way that represents British values and lives as under
constant threat from states and subjects that submit to the dictates of an inherently
violent, backward and anti-Western religion.66
Like guidebooks and CONTEST, Egyptian counterterrorism discourses construct
threatening spaces and subjects in ways that connect religion to violence and poverty.
These discourses have been (re)produced by the most recent Egyptian government
and economic elites both formally and informally, through local and national policies
as well as more mundane discourses. Here I am not conﬂating economic elites with the
state or vice versa, but rather identifying articulations between their representations
that produce mutually constitutive discourses. The Mubarak government, for instance,
positioned the government and country as under permanent threat of ‘destabilisation’
from, among other things, Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and
those linked to terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, depicted
as threatening to impede Egypt’s move towards liberal democracy.67 In opposition,
the government represented itself as a preserver of ‘proper, as opposed to excessive
or incorrect, Islam’,68 a ‘moderate rational enlightened’ version of Islam that ‘is in
the national interest’.69 State discourses articulate with guidebook representations
that, although critical of the government’s failure to implement Western liberal
democracy, speciﬁcally describe the Egyptian government as part of the less religious
extreme of society. The RG and LP depict the Mubarak government as supportive of
the West and of progress along secular lines, emphasising how it was part of Bush’s
‘Coalition of the Willing’70 and marginalises the Muslim Brotherhood.71
Representations in recent Egyptian counterterrorism discourses imply an inherent
link between Islamist movements, violence and poverty by associating all three with
the ‘demographic masses’ and urban spaces. Government and economic elite discourses
have connected the general population and urban spaces with crime, disorder, violent
protest, lawlessness, and nuisances.72 These depictions draw on representations of
to justice and security. See Home Ofﬁce, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, pp. 83, 85, 92, 97. CONTEST
also recommends addressing individual grievances such as inequalities in education, health, housing, the
labour market, lack of social mobility, and underemployment based on race and faith (2009), pp. 89, 91.
64 Home Ofﬁce, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, p. 157.
65 Ibid., p. 56.
66 CONTEST’s threatening spaces and subjects, which articulate with those constructed by guidebooks,
thereby similarly position UK subjects as superior responsible individuals, speciﬁcally emphasising their
‘Britishness’.
67 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Mission to Egypt, p. 7; Sarah Carr, ‘UN Expert
Issues Damning Report on Egypt’s Counterterrorism Measures’, The Daily News Egypt (29 October
2009), available at: {http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=25502} 18 January 2010.
68 Lila Abu-Lughod, Local Contexts of Islamism in Popular Media (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press, 2006), p. 10.
69 Abu-Lughod, Local Contexts of Islamism in Popular Media, p. 14.
70 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 16.
71 Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, p. 789; Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 45.
72 Timothy Mitchell, ‘Making the Nation’, pp. 222, 228; Denis, ‘Cairo as Neo-Liberal Capital?’;
Singerman and Amar, ‘Introduction’, p. 22.
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the Arab metropolis as ‘a terrorist risk factory that is necessarily ‘‘Islamic’’ ’.73 More
speciﬁcally, Egyptian counterterrorism discourses have labelled such spaces as
‘ashwa’iyat’, a word used to identify the ‘slums, shantytowns and the self-made satellite
cities of the poor’ and describe the people therein as ‘risky, ‘‘hazardous’’, and errant
ﬁgures’.74
Reﬂecting guidebooks and CONTEST tactics, Egyptian counterterrorism dis-
courses hold neither economic elites nor the state responsible for the grievances of
these subjects and spaces, reinforcing the links made between Islam, poverty, and
violence. Such discourses foreclose discussions of government corruption and the
increasing gap between rich and poor as a result of liberalisation policies. Instead
they rely on and celebrate the altruism of the benevolent privileged few as a source
of ﬁnancial redistribution, mainly in the form of soup kitchens and tables of food
during Ramadan.75 Eric Denis argues that this charity has become an ‘urban bourgeois
value and a way of self-presentation essential to the image of a good citizen and good
Muslim’.76 In so doing, Egyptian counterterrorism discourses follow CONTEST in
implying that any challenge to Egyptian state policies – currently applied by the
Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) – are an indication of potential terrorism,
limiting any dissent that challenges the government and its policies. Indeed, Egypt
deﬁnes terrorists broadly as those ‘who are dangerous to public security and order’.77
Amongst those arrested and detained for terrorism in Egypt include those with no
clear link to terrorist violence, such as ‘internet bloggers critical of the government,
human rights activists, members of the country’s largest opposition group the Muslim
Brotherhood, and journalists’.78 By decontextualising poverty and violence, Egyptian
counterterrorism discourses have positioned the government and economic elites
as altruistic ‘liberals, or globalizers or democratizers’,79 those implementing and
emulating liberal democratic values under threat from an inherently violent general
population. Although these discourses contradict guidebook and CONTEST repre-
sentations that depict a failure to achieve Western liberal democracy as endogenous
to the state concerned, the representations of all three articulate in the descriptions
and strategies they use to identify and characterise risk.
Guidebooks, CONTEST, and Egyptian counterterrorism discourses identify risk
with spaces and subjects represented as essentially different due to the nature of their
Islamic faith. In so doing they articulate intertextually to construct the ﬁgure of the
‘bad’ Muslim that is an inherent threat to Western tourists, British citizens, and
Egyptian elites. On the surface therefore guidebooks and CONTEST avoid simple
tourist/host, British/Muslim dichotomies by differentiating between different sectors
of Egyptian society and types of Muslims. What this more complex positioning of
Egyptian and Muslim subjects allows for is a contingent articulation between three
subject positions ‘under threat’ from corresponding ﬁgures and spaces of risk: the
73 Denis, ‘Cairo as Neo-Liberal Capital?’, p. 49.
74 Ibid., pp. 51–2.
75 Ibid., p. 57.
76 Ibid.
77 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Mission to Egypt, p. 14.
78 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Mission to Egypt, p. 13; Carr, ‘UN Expert Issues
Damning Report on Egypt’s Counterterrorism Measures’.
79 Singerman and Amar, ‘Introduction’, p. 9.
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Egyptian elite subject, the Western tourist, and the British citizen, who are all
similarly positioned through these discourses. The representation of two extremes of
Egyptian society, rather than a homogeneous ‘other’, functions to produce inequalities
as it (re)produces the superiority of detached Western tourists, the British state and
Egyptian elites who take the responsibility to help ‘good’ Muslim ‘victims’ in a way
that follows and entrenches ‘universal’ standards of development. The discourse of
‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims therefore makes known the threat in a way that positions
Western liberal democracy, and those who successfully adhere to it, as superior in a
way that is not territorially deﬁned but based on shared values.
This discourse also reﬂects and contributes to post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ dis-
courses, which have shifted from emphasising a clash between ‘civilisation’ and a
‘Barbarian Other’80 to a concern with the battle between ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’
Muslims, understood as those that strive towards and those that threaten Western
liberal values, policies, and subjects.81 Contemporary ‘othering’ is tied to ‘values’,
which marks a shift of focus from the ‘immutable origins’ that were the basis of
Orientalist ‘othering’ strategies.82 Indeed, it is CONTEST’s explicit aim to ‘elevate
‘‘moderate Muslims’’ to become the strongest voices in Muslim communities, able
to lead a campaign promoting ‘‘shared values’’ and isolating the ‘‘extremists’’ ’.83
Guidebooks, CONTEST, and Egyptian counterterrorism discourses articulate inter-
textually to (re)produce post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ discourses that assume that ‘a good
Muslim, paradoxically, is a secular Muslim who is inﬂuenced by the West’ and can
be ‘assisted into modernity’, while a bad Muslim is ‘anti-modern’ and inherently
destructive.84 In so doing guidebooks, in articulation with UK and Egyptian counter-
terrorism discourses, function to construct and make known a religiously deﬁned
sector of Egyptian society represented as an inherent threat to Western tourists and
their values. Lila Abu-Lughod argues that such classiﬁcations have revived ‘a pro-
foundly civilizational discourse’.85
It is important to note that guidebooks, CONTEST, and Egyptian counter-
terrorism discourses do not represent this threat as ﬁxed and easily identiﬁable.
Guidebooks, which make a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims in their
representations of the two extremes of Egyptian society, at the same time contend
that ‘the bulk of the Egyptian populace falls somewhere between these two extremes’.86
This means both that ‘most Egyptians’ are horriﬁed by terrorist atrocities,87 but also
that ‘the Islamists’ view of world events is broadly shared at every level of society,
from janitors to generals’.88 Guidebooks thereby represent all Egyptian subjects and
spaces as posing a risk to Western tourists in the presence of a potentially threatening
sector of society. Reﬂecting guidebook discourses, CONTEST describes how radicalised
80 Melanie Richter-Montpetit, ‘Empire, Desire and Violence: A Queer Transnational Feminist Reading of
the Prisoner ‘‘Abuse’’ in Abu Ghraib and the Question of ‘‘Gender Equality’’ ’, International Feminist
Journal of Politics, 9:1 (2007), pp. 42, 48.
81 Arun Kundnani, Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism (London: Institute of Race Relations,
2009), available at: {http://www.irr.org.uk/spooked/} 31 January 2010, p. 39.
82 Said, Orientalism, p. 233. For a discussion of orientalism, see pp. 633–634.
83 Kundnani, Spooked, p. 35.
84 Sherene Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2008), p. 49.
85 Abu-Lughod, Local Contexts of Islamism in Popular Media, p. 5.
86 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 64.
87 Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, p. 58.
88 Ibid., p. 789.
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states and citizens are a minority, but that the Muslim community as a whole is
‘vulnerable’, requiring suspicion and surveillance.89 Anyone could be a terrorist,
especially with the increased prominence of so-called ‘self-starting’ groups as al-Qaeda
fragments in the context of increased international pressure.90 Egyptian counter-
terrorism discourses similarly identify risk with the general population and urban
spaces, suggesting a threat from anyone but a small minority of elites. These dis-
courses replace a discourse of ‘enemies’ with one of threatening spaces and subjects,
which is more powerful in its versatility and ability to exclude a whole people. Guide-
books, CONTEST, and Egyptian counterterrorism discourses thereby produce a
threat that, although speciﬁcally deﬁned, is generalised and difﬁcult to pinpoint. In so
doing they constitute all Egyptians and Muslims as potentially threatening subjects.
Producing protection 1: states of exception
Having deﬁned risk in this way, guidebooks proceed with their ﬁrst strategy to
attract Western tourists. The way that guidebooks construct and make known this
risk allows them to encourage and defend risk-mitigation strategies that require
strong safety and security measures. Guidebooks do so by emphasising how tourists
are protected from ‘bad’ Muslims through the extensive security measures taken by
the Egyptian government.91 These measures are paradoxically laws that suspend the
rule of law for ‘bad’ Muslims in the interests of security. They can be understood as
(re)producing states of exception, camps of ‘rightless’ people that are located outside
of the political community and whose lives do not matter.92 However, as Aihwa Ong
points out, the ‘exception’ can be ‘deployed to include as well as to exclude’. Articu-
lations between these forms of exception have meant that they are not mutually exclu-
sive but that ‘different degrees of protection can be negotiated for the politically
excluded’ based on the multiple possible ways that subjects are evaluated and valued
in different contexts.93 Guidebooks’ ﬁrst strategy to attract Western tourists is to use
the representation of ‘bad’ Muslims as an essential, irrational, and violent threat
to tourists – and indeed to the values of Western liberal democracy as a whole – to
justify Egyptian government measures that locate these ‘bad’ Muslims in a variety of
states of exception.
Here, guidebook representations articulate with Egyptian counterterrorism dis-
courses, (re)produced through broader government discourses, which have used the
threat posed by ‘bad’ Muslims to Western tourists and ancient relics to justify the
political and economic exclusion of the demographic masses from tourist sites. Scholars
have documented how state and local governments have violently evicted Egyptians
working and living in historical sites such as the Pyramids, the tombs in Luxor, and
Islamic Cairo, depicting these locals as uncivilised, lawless slum-dwellers and tomb-
89 Home Ofﬁce, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, p. 84.
90 Ibid., pp. 49–50.
91 See Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 81; Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, pp. 57,
58. The LP speciﬁcally argues that ‘Egypt is presently no more or less dangerous than any other
country, your own included’ (p. 506). The LP is not consistent in this point as earlier it highlights how
‘terrorist attacks are starting to occur with worrying regularity’ (p. 16).
92 Razack, Casting Out, pp. 6–7, 11; Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life,
trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 7–9.
93 Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2006), pp. 5–6, 24.
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raiders, while monuments like the Pyramids have been closed on Egyptian holidays
to limit visits from the general population.94 The Egyptian government has justiﬁed
these practices as a means of protecting tourists and relics. Guidebooks outline the
exclusion of locals from tourist sites95 but fail to implicate tourism and tourists in
their indirect support for such Egyptian state policies. Instead they use this informa-
tion as a means of positioning their tourists as responsible and worldly travellers,
superior and detached in their knowledge of the ‘real’ effects of mass tourism and
repressive governments.96 By valuing the human rights of travellers over those of
hosts and foreclosing critical reﬂection on tourist privileges and prejudices, guide-
books maintain what Lisle calls ‘an ethics without a politics’.97 The intertextual
articulation of guidebook representations and Egyptian counterterrorism discourses,
which similarly position Western tourists and Egyptian elites as ‘at risk’ from ‘bad’
Muslims, functions thereby to privilege the rights of Western tourists, while those of
many Egyptian citizens are suspended.
Insofar as guidebooks employ a logic parallel to Egyptian counterterrorism dis-
courses and CONTEST to represent the threat to Western tourists, they also produce
an acceptance of the broader counterterrorism measures taken against ‘bad’ Muslims
by both the Egyptian and UK governments as part of the ‘war on terror’. The most
recent Egyptian government used threats from terrorism and destabilisation on the
part of ‘bad’ Muslims to justify its state of emergency. A 2009 report from the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism (SR) found that, in practice, the
Egyptian emergency law gave State Security Investigations (SSI), located outside of
the regular legislative channels, ‘carte blanche’ powers to arrest and detain individuals
deemed ‘dangerous to public security and order’. These individuals could be held
without charge or trial for years, sometimes in undisclosed detention centres where
they were ‘incommunicado’ and likely subject to torture.98 To the extent that Egyptian
counterterrorism discourses brand the demographic masses as essentially ‘bad’ Mus-
lims and maintain a broad deﬁnition of terrorism, counterterrorism measures can be
used to indeﬁnitely suspend the rights of the majority of the population. Indeed, the
SR argues that Egypt’s deﬁnition of terrorism ‘may unjustiﬁably restrict the enjoy-
ment of human rights pertaining to the exercise of peaceful activities, including dis-
sent and political opposition’.99 The report points out that the most recent Egyptian
government often used Emergency Supreme State Security Courts – which the SR
argues do not offer a fair trial – to try suspects in cases where charges have no
clear connection to terrorist acts.100 In 2007, changes were made to article 179 of the
94 Mitchell, ‘Making the Nation’, pp. 222, 228; Elsheshtawy, ‘Urban Transformations’; Kuppinger,
‘Pyramids and Alleys’; Singerman and Amar, ‘Introduction’; Williams, ‘Reconstructing Islamic Cairo’;
Wynn, Pyramids and Nightclubs; Maria Golia, City of Sand (Cairo: The American University in Cairo
Press, 2004), p. 126.
95 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, pp. 106, 126, 140, 147; Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to
Egypt, p. 208.
96 Guidebooks see this type of tourist as proof of the fact that travel is a ‘global beneﬁt’ that offers
‘opportunities for greater contact and awareness among people’. See Firestone et al., Lonely Planet
Egypt, pp. 480, 524; Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, p. 28.
97 Lisle, ‘Humanitarian Travels’, p. 171.
98 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Mission to Egypt, pp. 14–16, 18; Carr, ‘UN Expert
Issues Damning Report on Egypt’s Counterterrorism Measures’.
99 Ibid., p. 12.
100 Ibid., pp. 20–3.
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Egyptian Constitution as part of the transition to replace the emergency law with
a counterterrorism law. The SR has found that these changes continue to allow for
suspects to be arrested, interrogated, and monitored without judicial oversight,
becoming ‘a permanent state of emergency, although under a new name’.101 The SR
has expressed strong concerns that the state of emergency has ‘become the norm’,102
producing a ‘culture of exceptionality’.103 Indeed the ruling SCAF has not only
extended the state of emergency, including the use of ‘emergency state security courts’,
but has expanded its mandate, citing threats from, among other things, labour strikes,
false rumours, thuggery, and trafﬁc disruptions (alluding to those caused by recent
demonstrations).104 By constructing a risk to the lives and Western liberal democratic
values of the Egyptian government and economic elites, Egyptian counterterrorism
discourses have produced and justiﬁed the suspension of rights for those subjects and
spaces represented as inherently threatening. In so doing, Egyptian counterterrorism
discourses articulate intertextually with guidebooks’ representations of a bifurcated
Egyptian society to further justify the protection of ‘good’ Muslims. Guidebooks’
positive depiction of ‘good’ Muslims as pro-Western and economically successful
reveals the political and economic, rather than purely territorial, logic that values
and protects certain citizens and excludes others.105
Similarly, CONTEST speciﬁcally outlines changes to British laws that jeopardise
individual rights in order to counter the threat from international terrorism. These
include, for instance, ‘control orders’ – introduced in 2005 – that place speciﬁc obli-
gations on individuals in order to ‘prevent, restrict or disrupt’ their alleged terrorist
involvement.106 These obligations mainly include restrictions on movement or com-
munication. Control orders can be imposed in a closed court for security reasons,
and can last indeﬁnitely.107 In recent cases, control orders have been ruled as ‘unlaw-
ful’ by High Court rulings.108 CONTEST itself acknowledges that control orders
have been challenged successfully for depriving liberty under Article 5 of the European
Court of Human Rights.109 CONTEST maintains, however, that they are key to
maintaining security,110 arguing that their prosecution measures ‘reﬂect a proper
balance between the security of all and the liberty and privacy of the individual’.111
The document therefore contends that these laws are justiﬁable within – and indeed
101 Ibid., pp. 10–11; Carr, ‘UN Expert Issues Damning Report on Egypt’s Counterterrorism Measures’.
102 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Mission to Egypt, p. 7.
103 Ibid., p. 5; Carr, ‘UN Expert Issues Damning Report on Egypt’s Counterterrorism Measures’.
104 Samer al-Atrush, ‘Egypt Military to Widen State of Emergency’, AFP (12 September 2011), available at:
{http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gC0xgXy1LelXX6mYEGGHQBiYOMBQ?
docIdCNG.37f490980793ed822010b69c4858a6ab.411} accessed 6 October 2011.
105 Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception, p. 16. I expand more on this point in the next section with reference
to Ong’s work, which focuses on the economic logics that deﬁne citizenship in contemporary liberalism.
106 The UK Home Secretary announced in January 2011 that ‘control orders’ would be replaced by
‘Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures’ by the end of the year. These measures have been
critiqued, however, for being ‘little more than ‘‘control orders lite’’ ’. See ‘Theresa May: Control Orders
To Be replaced’, BBC News (26 January 2011), available at: {http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12287074}
accessed 6 October 2011.
107 Home Ofﬁce, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, p. 67.
108 Dominic Casciani, ‘Terror suspects ‘‘able to sue’’ over control orders’, BBC News (28 July 2010),
available at: {http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10788933} 6 October 2011.
109 Home Ofﬁce, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, pp. 68–9.
110 Ibid., pp. 68–9.
111 Ibid., pp. 72–3, 69.
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uphold – the principles and values of liberal democracy as a response to those threat-
ening them.112 However, to the extent that CONTEST has constructed this threat as
explicitly arising from a form of Islam, and underscores the potential for all Muslims
to become radicalised, it is the rights of this speciﬁc group that are targeted for
suspension. Indeed, Arun Kundnani warns that, within counterterrorism discourses,
mainstream UK Muslims are no longer seen as ‘citizens to whom the state is
accountable but potential recruits to a global counter-insurgency’.113 Insofar as
CONTEST constructs groups and spaces that pose an inherent threat to Western
liberal democracy and its subjects, it constitutes and simultaneously justiﬁes a limit
to liberalism’s universal application114 and identiﬁes those subjects and spaces to
which it does not apply.
The intertextually constructed religiously based threat to Western liberal demo-
cratic values and subjects functions thereby to justify the (re)production of states of
exception that speciﬁcally target ‘bad’ Muslims. This justiﬁcation manages to resolve
the aforementioned contradictions between representations of Egyptian government
practices found in guidebooks and CONTEST, and those produced by the Egyptian
government itself. Guidebooks and CONTEST pinpoint the Egyptian government’s
failures to universally apply Western liberal democratic values as a source of terrorist
grievances. However, Egyptian counterterrorism discourses explain their failure to
universally apply these values in a way that articulates with guidebook and CONTEST
justiﬁcations: all three discourses represent states of exception for ‘bad’ Muslims
as a means to protect subjects and spaces that uphold Western liberal democratic
values. The exception to Western liberal democratic values is paradoxically revealed
as a principle internal to it.
Sherene Razack argues that, with the so-called war on terror, ‘the camp has
become the rule . . . inspired by a sense of permanent emergency and endless war’.115
The particular way that guidebooks represent and make ‘risk’ known, which fails to
implicate Western liberal subjects and spaces, justiﬁes the exclusion of inherently
threatening spaces and subjects. To the extent that they construct a population in
essential opposition to Western liberal democracy, guidebooks can be seen as con-
tributing to the justiﬁcation for the ‘war on terror’. At the same time this ﬁrst guide-
book strategy articulates with UK and Egyptian counterterrorism discourses to
constitute Egyptian spaces and subjects as non-threatening and appealing to tourists.
Producing protection II: exceptional states
Having justiﬁed locating ‘bad’ Muslims in states of exception, guidebooks proceed
with their second strategy to attract tourists. Insofar as they imply that tourists with
Western liberal democratic values are inherently progressive, guidebooks can locate
Western tourists in ‘exceptional states’. Exceptional states focus attention away from
112 See Home Ofﬁce, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, p. 157. CONTEST explicitly argues that ‘the duty
on all of us – Government, citizens and communities – is to challenge those who, for whatever reason
or cause, reject the rights to which we are committed, scorn the institutions and values of our parlia-
mentary democracy, dismiss the rule of law and promote intolerance and discrimination’ (p. 87).
113 Kundnani, Spooked, p. 40.
114 Former British Communities Minister Hazel Blears stated in 2009 that ‘this country is proud of its
tradition of fair play and good manners, welcoming of diversity, tolerant of others. This is a great
strength. But the pendulum has swung too far’. Kundnani, Spooked, p. 21.
115 Razack, Casting Out, p. 12.
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threats to tourists. Instead they (re)produce and privilege the ‘safe’ spaces and subject
positions of a colonial ‘golden age’, which are no less essentialised than ﬁgures and
spaces of risk. Exceptional states cater to colonial nostalgia for this ‘golden age’
located within a universal narrative of development according to Western liberal
criteria, which functions also to protect those spaces and subjects that ‘ﬁt’ somewhere
along this timeline. These spaces and subject positions parallel and articulate inter-
textually with those privileged in UK and Egyptian counterterrotism discourses.
Exceptional states effectively protect and privilege the human, economic, and political
rights of Western tourists, British citizens, and ‘good’ Muslims who maintain Western
liberal democratic values. In so doing, exceptional states work together with states of
exception to (re)produce and reinforce a particular world order.
Guidebooks spatially locate tourists in the Pharaonic past of tombs and temples,
thereby representing a temporally deﬁned ‘tourist’ space. In passages and photo-
graphs that describe and recommend day-to-day tourist activities and interactions,
guidebooks invite tourists to step back in time,116 and prioritise ancient sites in their
itineraries.117 If people are included in photographs of these sites they are generally
Egyptians in traditional dress. The location of tourists in ancient sites, is a familiar
and comfortable image for British tourists. Egypt’s past and it monuments have
been appropriated and constructed, since colonial times, as representing the origins
of Western civilisation, incorporating Egypt’s heritage into a linear narrative of
Western history whose endpoint is modern Western liberal democracy.118 Through
this narrative Egypt is positioned as behind in a progressive ‘queue’ judged accord-
ing to Western development standards.119 Representations of tourist sites efface
references to the more recent historical context of these spaces and avoid their asso-
ciation with images of contemporary Islam, urban poverty, or modern Egyptian
subjects that represent a threat to tourists. Such associations might disrupt the
universal evolutionary queue as they elude classiﬁcation according to its logic; they
are not exclusively representative of ‘underdeveloped’ spaces nor do they reﬂect the
utopian image of Western liberal democracy.120 By avoiding these images and relocat-
ing Egypt ‘even further back in time’ in the ancient past, guidebooks restore the queue
and construct ‘tourist’ spaces as safe from threats.121 Tourist spaces are ‘exceptional’
in that they essentialise a Western development model and privilege those spaces and
subjects that ‘ﬁt’ within its narrative.
The location of Western tourists in ‘exceptional states’ simultaneously produces
privileged and essentialised tourist subject positions. By prioritising ancient Egypt,
guidebooks invite tourists to take on the role of colonial explorers, arguing that
‘Egypt brings out the explorer in all of us’.122 Tourists are thereby encouraged to
(re)incorporate Egypt into rational Western history,123 without a mention of the
116 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 126.
117 Ibid., pp. 22–8.
118 Kuppinger, ‘Pyramids and Alleys’; Said, Orientalism, p. 86; Wynn, Pyramids and Nightclubs, p. 24;
Derek Bryce, ‘Repackaging Orientalism: Discourse on Egypt and Turkey in British Outbound Tourism’,
Tourist Studies, 7:2 (2007), pp. 165–91, 177, 178.
119 Lisle, The Global Politics of Contemporary Travel Writing, pp. 204–6.
120 Ibid., p. 217.
121 Ibid.
122 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 5.
123 Bryce, ‘Repackaging Orientalism’, p. 180.
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West’s physical and discursive appropriation of Egypt’s past in which they are effec-
tively participating. At the same time, guidebooks locate their tourists among a
community of like-minded travellers who independently know, observe, and judge
the ‘real’ Egypt from separate and superior positions, explicitly differentiating them
from mass tourists.124 Guidebooks exclude tourists from photographs, locating them
as detached observers of the aforementioned reiﬁed ancient scenes and objects. In
its quest to offer travellers an authentic experience, the LP presents tourists with
clothing and body-language tips to ‘blend in’ as a ‘resident expat, thus deﬂecting
attention onto the more obvious tourists walking behind [them] – and giving [them]
more opportunity to enjoy the good things about Cairo’.125 Tourists’ absence from
photographs and ability to ‘blend in’ are tropes functioning to position Western tourists
as observers of the ‘real’ Egypt who are themselves not observed.126 Guidebooks
thereby maintain continuities with nineteenth-century photographic representations
that portrayed the ‘real’ Egypt, cut off from its observer, as well as with British
colonial tourists to Egypt who similarly disguised themselves to maintain an ‘invisible
gaze’.127 With reference to these colonial practices, Mitchell argues that ‘to see without
being seen conﬁrmed one’s separation from the world, and corresponded at the same
time to a position of power’.128 Guidebook tourists are thereby scripted to enact a
modern colonial gaze that keeps a sovereign distance in order to gain visual command
over spaces. At the same time, both guidebooks position tourists as superior by con-
stantly ridiculing Egypt through cynicism and humour in their texts. In guidebook
discussions of the Egyptian transport system, for instance, the LP explains that
scenes inside public buses usually resemble ‘a Guiness World Record attempt on
the greatest number of people in a ﬁxed space’129 and the RG exclaims that the new
yellow cabs ‘amazingly, actually use a meter’.130 Such statements reinforce Egypt’s
inferior position in relation to tourists according to the aforementioned ‘queue’.
Guidebooks thereby (re)produce tourists as modern autonomous individuals in rela-
tion to the simultaneously produced ‘object’ of their gaze.131
More speciﬁcally, guidebooks explicitly position tourists as descendants of British
colonial travellers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. They do so by suggesting
books from this period as pre-departure reading.132 Several scholars, including Derek
Gregory, Timothy Mitchell and Edward W. Said, argue that such texts, and corre-
sponding colonial-era practices like photography and tourism, produced Egypt as
a transparent and legible space, laying the groundwork for imperialism.133 To do
so they draw on Said’s theory of ‘Orientalism’, a cultural enterprise and system
of knowledge about the ‘Orient’ institutionalised in the late eighteenth century by
124 Lisle, ‘Humanitarian Travels’, p. 162.
125 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 156.
126 Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988),
pp. 23, 26.
127 Ibid., pp. 21–7.
128 Ibid., p. 26.
129 Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 532.
130 Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, p. 93.
131 Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt, pp. 20, 24, 28.
132 These include ‘Flaubert in Egypt: A Sensibility on Tour’, ‘A Thousand Miles up the Nile’, ‘Letters
from Egypt’ (Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, p. 19), and ‘The Manners and Customs of the
Modern Egyptians’ (Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, p. 803).
133 Derek Gregory, ‘Scripting Egypt: Orientalism and the Cultures of Travel’, in James Duncan and
Derek Gregory (eds), Writes of Passage: Reading Travel Writing (London; New York: Routledge,
1999), pp. 114–50; Said, Orientalism; Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt, pp. 21–31, 33.
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British and French empires and appropriated by the American empire since World
War II. Orientalism functions to constitute and deﬁne the West as superior in relation
to the Orient in a way that has (re)produced the West’s colonial practices.134 Said
explains that within Orientalist discourses ‘on the one hand there are Westerners,
and on the other there are Arab-Orientals; the former are (in no particular order)
rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, without natural
suspicion; the latter are none of these things’.135 Nonetheless, the LP and RG go on
to recommend activities, such as travelling on the Nile in dahabiyyas (two-masted
wooden sailboats) and steamboats, that re-enact eighteenth and nineteenth-century
British travelling practices as part of ‘nostalgia’ for the ‘colonial tradition’.136 Guide-
books equate these colonially inspired travellers with a kind of worldliness and
heritage but at the same time fail to contextualise or critically reﬂect on the role of
British colonialism in Egypt. The RG is more critical than the LP, which at points
explicitly legitimises and praises the British occupation,137 but neither guidebook
is self-reﬂexive about the Orientalist assumptions behind their depictions of ‘bad’
Muslims,138 or indeed behind the travelling practices of contemporary Western
tourists in Egypt. Guidebooks also fail to outline the part tourism and tourists played
in imperialism. F. Robert Hunter outlines speciﬁc links between tourism and the
West’s conquest of the Middle East, focusing on the reciprocal relationship between
imperialism and Thomas Cook and Sons’ development of tourism in Egypt from
1869 to 1914.139 He argues that the British Empire was vital to tourism development
as it offered protection, supportive local governments, and new regions for develop-
ment. At the same time, tourism was vital to the British empire as Thomas Cook and
Son’s company not only directly aided imperial ventures by conveying an expedi-
tionary force to Sudan to rescue General Gordon in 1884, but helped Britain main-
tain its empire by deepening Egypt’s economic dependence, developing good ties
with locals, spreading support for empire through British tourists, and maintaining
a British presence in Upper Egypt. By obfuscating the relationship between tourism
and empire, tourists’ positioning by guidebooks is part of the process of nostalgia for
‘innocent and uncorrupted’ spaces of a (ﬁctional) ‘golden age’ with its clearly deﬁned
subject positions and power relations.140 By locating tourists as detached explorers
134 Said, Orientalism, pp. 1–6, 16–17, 34.
135 Said, Orientalism, p. 49.
136 See Richardson and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, pp. 44, 80, 31; Firestone et al., Lonely Planet
Egypt, pp. 79, 83, 88–9, 90. Gregory draws similar parallels between nineteenth and twentieth-century
writings on Egypt and contemporary tourism representations of Egypt that suggest nostalgia for, and a
(re)performance of, colonial cultures of travel and the occupation of corresponding subject positions.
See Derek Gregory, ‘Colonial Nostalgia and Cultures of Travel: Spaces of Constructed Visibility in
Egypt’, in Nezar AlSayyad (ed.), Consuming Tradition, Manufacturing Heritage: Global Norms and
Urban Forms in the Age of Tourism (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 111–51.
137 The LP argues that the British protectorate was imposed to help restore order to Egypt’s mismanaged
ﬁnancial situation. It points out the British protectorate’s positive role in Egypt, detailing how it
improved Egypt’s ﬁnances, bureaucracy and infrastructure. Both guidebooks acknowledge, however,
that European politicians and banks exploited Egypt’s weak economic condition for the beneﬁt of
UK foreign and economic policy. See Firestone et al., Lonely Planet Egypt, pp. 40–1; Richardson
and Jacobs, Rough Guide to Egypt, p. 777.
138 Said argues that Americans reproduce Orientalist discourses especially through government, busi-
nesses, media, and popular culture representations of Arabs and Islam, which justify violence against
the inherent threat they pose to the West. Said, Orientalism, pp. 284–7, 300–1; Edward W. Said,
Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World
(London: Vintage Books, 1997), pp. 5–12, 28–30.
139 F. Robert Hunter, ‘Tourism and Empire’.
140 Lisle, The Global Politics of Contemporary Travel Writing, pp. 207, 209.
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observing ancient Egypt, guidebooks position them ﬁrmly at the head of the afore-
mentioned ‘queue’, precluding any threats from, or complicity in, Egypt’s present.141
These colonial subject positions are located and protected in ‘exceptional states’, as
they perform roles that ﬁt into a reiﬁed linear narrative of Western development. A
retreat into these states functions to relieve present anxieties around ﬁgures and
spaces of risk by locating Egypt as part of a familiar discourse of Western origins or
control. Indeed, Gregory argues that ‘while they may be displaced, distorted, and
(most often) denied, the capacities that inhere within the colonial past are routinely
reafﬁrmed and reactivated in the colonial present’.142
A retreat to colonial subjectivities in guidebooks articulates with Britain’s move,
reﬂected in CONTEST, to prioritise loyalty to ‘Britishness’ above all else. Indeed,
Simon Gikandi argues that English identity – and its ‘master narratives’, including
liberal universalism and modernity – was shaped through and understood in relation
to colonial subjects and spaces.143 According to Gikandi, there is currently a ‘crisis of
Englishness’, which he attributes to the fact that its identities and narratives lost their
validity outside of imperialism, forcing ‘the imagined community to be unravelled’.144
Gikandi argues that this crisis is reinforced by ‘the large migration of formerly
colonized subjects into the metropolitan centre’,145 which has brought into question
the spatio-temporal differentiations that helped deﬁne ‘Englishness’. CONTEST
addresses similar concerns related to ‘Britishness’, which unlike ‘Englishness’ does
not differentiate between or deﬁne itself in opposition to countries within the United
Kingdom. The UK’s solution, reﬂected in CONTEST, is to shift from policies of
tolerance and multiculturalism, which have been seen as allowing inherent (Muslim)
threats to develop,146 towards a civic integration approach, which involves respecting
the ‘principles and values of the UK’ and retaining differences in the private realm.147
Guidebooks’ second tactic, which produces and privileges colonial subject positions
in exceptional states, therefore articulates with CONTEST in a way that reinforces
Britishness and assuages post-colonial anxieties and fears brought on by globalisa-
tion. This second tactic supports the ﬁrst, which identiﬁes and locates ‘bad’ Muslims
in states of exception, reﬂecting how the current retreat into a ‘universal’ liberal British
identity requires, (re)produces, and (re)excludes the ‘other’ for its deﬁnition.148 Indeed,
according to Gikandi, travel and ‘self-realization in the spaces of the other’, continues
to be a vital means by which ‘Europe and its others are re-created’.149 The guide-
books’ production of safe exceptional states for tourists thereby articulates with the
production of a safe UK, scripting the roles and interactions of its subjects.
141 Ibid., pp. 210, 213.
142 Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present, p. 7.
143 See Simon Gikandi, Maps of Englishness: Writing Identity in the Culture of Colonialism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 3–5, 7, 8. Gikandi highlights how liberalism, which professes
to serve a universal constituency, is predicated on and continues to reproduce, systematic political
exclusions.
144 Gikandi, Maps of Englishness, pp. 9, 28, 31, 33.
145 Ibid., p. 49.
146 Razack, Casting Out, p. 95; Kundnani, Spooked, p. 7; Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, ‘The Multi-
cultural State We’re In: Muslims, ‘‘Multiculture’’ and the ‘‘Civic Re-balancing’’ of British Multi-
culturalism’, Political Studies, 57:3 (2009), pp. 473–97, 2, 9.
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Guidebooks’ location of tourists in the ancient past articulates also with govern-
ment and tourism industry discourses that have contributed to the production of
exceptional states. Like guidebooks, the Egyptian government’s counterterrorism
discourses as well as nationalist and tourism industry strategies allow Pharaonic
Egypt to stand in for Egypt’s ‘modern’ identity, distancing themselves from Islamic
identities.150 To ‘protect’ tourists and Egyptian heritage, Egypt is increasingly restoring
its sites in a way that creates safe and sanitised outdoor museums that prioritise the
distant past and the appeal of its heritage.151 This representation of Egypt that
prioritises its ancient past, and its associated restoration projects, is supported by in-
ternational organisations like the European Union, UNESCO and UNDP, who see
these sites as part of Western history, and indeed the history of humankind.152 To
represent the ‘real’ Egypt and protect tourists, these international actors, along with
the Egyptian state and tourism industry, support projects of spatial (re)organisation
that physically and discursively efface the more recent historical contexts of these
sites and their relationship with people as spaces of residence and employment,
reifying and privileging their (narrowly-deﬁned) ‘artifacts’.153 The absence of the
Egyptian general population from tourist sites, based on its aforementioned threat
to tourists and monuments, reinforces a depiction of the ‘real’ Egypt as ﬁrmly
located in the ancient past. At the same time, this image of Egypt articulates with
guidebooks to physically produce exceptional states in a way that privileges the
rights of Western tourists.
The image of Egypt produced through this articulation functions also to protect
and privilege the political and economic rights of Egyptians adhering to Western liberal
democratic principles. It does so ﬁrstly by contributing to the (re)production of Egypt’s
Pharaonic nationalism, which associates Egypt with its ‘glorious’ ancient past.154
Political parties prior to Egypt’s 1952 revolution adopted Pharaonic nationalism as
a tactic in the struggle against British colonialism.155 It was also a key source of
inspiration for Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egyptian president from 1956 to 1970, who
embraced secular rule.156 In the 1970s, President Anwar Sadat solidiﬁed the newest
manifestation of Pharaonic Nationalism, which involved Egypt’s move towards
liberalisation and alignment with Western foreign policy,157 naming himself ‘the last
150 Vitalis, ‘Middle East on the Edge of the Pleasure Periphery’, p. 5; Mitchell, ‘Making the Nation’,
pp. 213–14; Wynn, Pyramids and Nightclubs, pp. 24, 60, 69–70.
151 Mitchell, ‘Making the Nation’; Elsheshtawy, ‘Urban Transformations’; Kuppinger, ‘Pyramids and
Alleys’; Williams, ‘Reconstructing Islamic Cairo’; Wynn, Pyramids and Nightclubs.
152 Kuppinger, ‘Pyramids and Alleys’, Williams, ‘Reconstructing Islamic Cairo’; Wynn, Pyramids and
Nightclubs, pp. 69–70.
153 Wynn, Pyramids and Nightclubs, p. 71.
154 Donald M. Reid, ‘Nationalizing the Pharaonic Past: Egyptology, Imperialism, and Egyptian National-
ism, 1922–1952’, in James Janowski and Israel Gershoni (eds), Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab
Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 127–59, 128–9, 138.
155 Donald M. Reid, ‘Nationalizing the Pharaonic Past: Egyptology, Imperialism, and Egyptian National-
ism, 1922–1952’, in James Janowski and Israel Gershoni (eds), Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab
Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 127–59, 128–9, 138.
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‘‘Nasserism’’ and Egyptian State Policy, 1952–1958’, in James Janowski and Israel Gershoni (eds),
Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997),
pp. 150–67, 151, 155.
157 Along with liberalisation and an alliance with the West, this move also included peace with Israel and
controlled democratisation. See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: The Muslim
Brotherhood and Sadat’, in Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays (Cairo:
The American University in Cairo Press, 2002), pp. 35–51, 37–9.
636 Elisa Wynne-Hughes
of the Pharaohs’. Although he initially embraced both Egypt’s Pharaonic and Islamic
identities,158 towards the end of his tenure Sadat positioned himself and his regime
in opposition to Egyptians espousing more ‘extreme’ religiously deﬁned identities,
justifying policies that violently repressed Islamists.159 Indeed, Islamists who assassi-
nated Sadat deﬁned their actions with reference to this opposition when they shouted
‘We have killed the Pharaoh!’160 The dichotomous positioning of the Pharaonic state
and Islam at that moment corresponds with the construction of the ‘real’ Egypt
by tourism industry and government discourses. This narrowly deﬁned and elitist
Egyptian identity justiﬁed the political and economic exclusions161 that Islamists
were resisting and continues to do so through the state of emergency that was
imposed after Sadat’s death. The Pharaonic image of Egypt came to coalesce around
and reinforce the political agenda of Mubarak’s pro-Western, pro-liberalisation
regime that distanced itself from a ‘bad’ Muslim identity. Guidebook representations
that prioritise Egypt’s ancient sites and their depiction of the most recent government
as ‘good’ Muslims function together to produce exceptional states that essentially
privilege an Egyptian regime that maintains liberal democratic values.
Secondly, the production of ‘safe’ and appealing tourist spaces has advanced the
short-term ﬁnancial interests of Egyptian economic elites who largely beneﬁt from
tourism, often at the expense of the monuments themselves. In Luxor, for instance,
restoration projects prioritise the expedient production of safe, exclusionary, and
visually attractive ‘tourist’ spaces. In so doing they sacriﬁce conservation in terms
of historical accuracy and proper materials, disregarding the damage that the
increased presence of tourists is likely to cause to the monuments.162 These choices
158 Unlike Nasser, Sadat promoted pride in both Egypt’s civilisation and Islamic identity. See Reid,
‘Nationalizing the Pharaonic Past’, p. 149. He promoted himself as a ‘believer president’, reconciled
and actively engaged with the Muslim Brotherhood who had been banned under Nasser’s regime
(Ibrahim, ‘An Islamic Alternative in Egypt’, pp. 36, 46), and changed the constitution to emphasise
Sharia law (Golia, City of Sand, p. 198). This was part of Sadat’s attempt after Nasser’s death ‘to
consolidate his power in the face of many detractors – Nasserites, leftists, and Pan-Arabists’. See
Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘The Changing Face of Egypt’s Islamic Activism’, in Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt,
Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2002), pp. 69–
79, 71 and to distance himself from the Soviet Union in order to build closer ties with the West
(Ibrahim, ‘An Islamic Alternative in Egypt’, pp. 38, 45). At the same time, Sadat gave gifts of
Pharaonic antiquities to foreign political ﬁgures and was carrying a ‘gold-enamelled staff with a lotus
on top’ on the day he was assassinated (Golia, City of Sand, pp. 121–3). Sadat now rests beneath
a pyramid-shaped monument adorned with a quotation from the Koran (Reid, ‘Nationalizing the
Pharaonic Past’, p. 149), testament to the complex, rather than purely binary, relationship between
Pharaonic and Islamic nationalisms during Sadat’s regime.
159 Ibrahim, ‘An Islamic Alternative in Egypt’, pp. 35, 42; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘The Vindication of Sadat
in the Arab World’, in Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays (Cairo: The
American University in Cairo Press, 2002), pp. 201–23, 212. Arrests in the month before his death,
however, targeted Sadat’s entire religious and secular political opposition (Ibrahim, ‘The Vindication
of Sadat in the Arab World’, p. 212).
160 Wynn, Pyramids and Nightclubs, pp. 80–1.
161 Much of the opposition towards Sadat was based on the economic injustices and exclusions that were a
result of his liberalisation policies. See Ibrahim, ‘An Islamic Alternative in Egypt’, p. 40; Ibrahim, ‘The
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towards democratisation, paralleled by civil rights violations and widespread corruption by elites.
See Ibrahim, ‘An Islamic Alternative in Egypt’, pp. 41–2. Islamic groups were also opposed to Sadat’s
ban on the formation of religious political parties. See Ibrahim, ‘An Islamic Alternative in Egypt’,
pp. 42, 46, and his conciliation with Israel, a move seen as supporting Western imperialism. See
Ibrahim, ‘The Vindication of Sadat in the Arab World’, p. 209.
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reveal a contradictory articulation between the elite Egyptian discourses of national-
ism and liberalism, underscoring the contemporary liberal rationality underlying
Pharaonic nationalism. The contemporary iteration of liberalism – often referred to
as neoliberalism – goes further than classical liberalism, which opposes government
interference in the natural laws of the market,163 and ‘adopts the self-regulating free
market as the model for proper government’.164 This mode of governance speciﬁcally
prioritises economic logics and values deﬁned by market-driven truths,165 privileging
‘market-driven calculations’ and ‘self-governing subjects as preferred citizens’.166
Indeed, the ‘restoration’ of Egypt’s ancient monuments ultimately privileges Western
tourists, multinational corporations, and elites that own hotels, along with tour
guides who require a university degree to be licensed.167
Overall, the production of these exceptional states reveals the liberal logics
behind the inclusion and protection of the rights of Western tourists, as a means
of increasing the ﬂow of resources to ‘good’ Muslims, while less marketable and
proﬁtable ‘bad’ Muslims are excluded from tourist sites. Exclusions and inclusions
are therefore key to a logic of exception based on protecting politically and econom-
ically valued subjects rather than – and often at the expense of – territorially deﬁned
citizens.168 Ong explains that, within contemporary liberalism as a technology of
governing, the logic of exception not only excludes certain subjects from politics
and the beneﬁts of capitalist development,169 as in the case of those ‘bad’ Muslims
violently evicted from their spaces of work and residence, but becomes a practice
of governance that creates ‘new economic possibilities, spaces and techniques for
governing a population’.170 States of exception are therefore not entirely based on
the suspension of political rights but are strategies that function with exceptional
states to ‘differently regulate populations for optimal productivity’ through spatial
practices.171
The logics behind the production of exceptional states that protect tourists are
also shared by new state-subsidised urban development projects that protect ‘good’
Muslims ‘at risk’ from the general population. Egyptian real estate developers
are currently constructing gated communities for elites on the desert outskirts of
Cairo.172 Developers promote satellite cities as a form of protection for elites at risk
from the spaces and subjects of urban areas. Like guidebooks, they architecturally
market nostalgia for the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century colonial era of
Egypt – without any reference to the British occupation – as a solution to the insta-
bilities of the present. Paralleling the positioning of the tourist as colonial explorer in
tourist spaces, Egyptian elites are positioned as part of a detached and superior elite
national patrimony pioneering in the desert,173 which caters to a similar nostalgia.
163 Manfred B. Steger and Ravi K. Roy, Neoliberalism, pp. 2–3.
164 Ibid., p. 12.
165 Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception, pp. 4, 16.
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167 Wynn, Pyramids and Nightclubs, pp. 75–6.
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The construction of elite satellite communities is supported by and caters to a
liberal tenet that development should be left to the private sector. Real estate
developers involved in building these highly proﬁtable sites are supported by the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund through structural adjustment
programmes as well as indirectly by the most recent government, which has offered
them credit from public banks and holds down land prices.174 In this way these
exceptional states maintain the market rationality of ‘tourist’ spaces that prioritise
‘market-driven calculations’ and Western liberal democratic subjects. At the same
time, paradoxically, they have been highly subsidised and promoted by the state and
international ﬁnancial institutions, reinforcing the mutually beneﬁcial rather than
antagonist relationship between state and business elites’ discourses in the Egyptian
context. Indeed, the seclusion of elites in their own private participatory democracy,
where residents manage infrastructure and services through a common fund,175 goes
hand in hand with the aforementioned discourse of risk and states of exception,
which limit dissent to this contemporary liberal moral order and the political system
that supports it. The construction of risk thereby ‘legitimizes political de-liberalization
(including repression, torture, election-rigging) while promoting a particular landscape
of perverse economic liberalization (producing gates, walls, mass arrests, and surveil-
lance systems rather than any social or labour equivalent of a free market)’.176 In
these spaces as in tourism sites, the logic of exception functions as a market-driven
technique that produces spatially deﬁned economic possibilities and techniques to
manage populations.177 Such exceptional spaces thereby protect the economic, political,
and human rights of elites (or ‘good’ Muslims) who reside in and construct these
satellite cities, functioning to privilege Western liberal democratic subjects and de-
velopment models. The ﬂipside of the state of exception, where ‘bad’ Muslims are
denied rights within a political community, are exceptional states that privilege the
rights of those positioned at the other extreme of society.
Conclusion
Guidebook representations of Egyptian spaces and subjects construct Egypt as an
attractive tourist destination by producing and managing risk in a way that accounts
for terrorist threats and constructs these threats as manageable. They thereby negotiate
the meta-narratives of Egypt that characterise it as a ‘bomb’ or ‘tomb,’ as an explosive
device associated with pollution, terrorism, riots, and protests, or as ‘dead or ruthlessly
repressed’ with its ‘romantic myths of tombs and harems’ that lure tourists.178 More
than this, guidebooks articulate intertextually with UK and Egyptian counter-
terrorism discourses in ways that similarly protect and privilege Western liberal
democracy through states of exception and exceptional states. These exceptional
states work with states of exception in such a way that they are mutually constitutive,
underscoring the logic of exception that (re)produces the current Western liberal
order. Risk thereby functions as ‘a social and political construct that crystallizes,
174 Ibid., pp. 57–8.
175 Ibid., p. 60.
176 Singerman and Amar, ‘Introduction’, p. 22.
177 Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception, pp. 3–4, 5.
178 Singerman and Amar, ‘Introduction’, pp. 21–2.
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sorts, and normalizes dangers, fears, and anxieties that deﬁne and limit a given society’,
producing stigmatised subordinate groups, scapegoats, and illegitimate territories.179
By examining the articulations of guidebooks, CONTEST, and Egyptian govern-
ment and economic elite discourses, I have shown how tourism discourses function to
(re)produce and reinforce counterterrorism discourses. Highlighting the constitutive
role of tourism in international politics helps us better understand the complex and
mundane means through which Western liberal democracy is protected. Such a read-
ing of international politics disrupts the dichotomy between high and low politics
that privileges the former, by analysing how representations derived from tourism
texts and domestic counterterrorism policies – that respond to a nationally and inter-
nationally deﬁned threat – articulate in ways that redirect and reinforce discourses at
the local, domestic, and international levels. It is not therefore a question of whether
high or low politics are more important or powerful in international politics, but of
looking at how particular representations articulate transnationally in very speciﬁc
times and spaces.
179 Denis, ‘Cairo as Neo-Liberal Capital?’, p. 51.
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